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REMARKS 
STEPHEN J. FRIEDMAN 
Member, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City 
Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission 
First, I think it is important to begin with the question of the 
relevance of history to the particular activity we're talking about. 
Secondly, it is very important to understand the forces that are driv- 
ing banks into a particular activity because whether they're merely 
competitive forces or  fundamental economic forces has an important 
impact on your ability to deal with them. It is also necessary to 
understand how viable the current state of affairs is - whether we're 
in effect in equilibrium. Next, one must examine the effect of 
proposed changes on bank safety and soundness, on bank power, and 
critically, on the capital raising process. One has to look in a very 
detailed way at the question of competitive equality and the level 
playing field. 
The question of conflict of interest, which has received much 
attention, is critical. It seems to me the basic question is the extent 
to which relatively conventional tools in our regulatory system can 
deal with those conflicts. Some conflicts have to be prohibited; other 
conflicts can be regulated. Whether or  not the existing system is ade- 
quate to deal with them is really beside the point. The Congress is 
legislating in this area and it can authorize new tools to deal with new 
problems. 
There are two final questions. One is the relevance of the growth 
of unregulated financial intermediaries; the second is the relevance 
of recent experience. 
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
Before going through these issues, I want to make one general 
comment. In the case of deregulation in the financial markets, the 
87 
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answer one finds at the end of the analytical train is very much a 
function of how one approaches the issue to start with. The New York 
Times had an editorial a few days ago dealing with these issues and 
one of the recommendations of the editorial writer was "When in 
doubt, choose competition." It's very clear that is not the approach 
Congress uses, and my personal judgment is that it is probably not 
a sensible approach for most policy makers. That doesn't mean you 
don't end up with a pro-competitive choice. But the existence of 
markets, the shape of the markets, the nature of the intermediaries 
and their relationships with people are largely a function of the 
regulatory system that has been in place for the past half a century. 
A decision to choose a step which would result in increased competi- ' 
tion, which would remove a barrier, may change in a very fundamen- 
tal way the economic ground rules under which all those competitors 
and all those institutions are functioning. 
The final results of the adjustment process are highly uncertain, 
and every senator and every congressman is very sensitive to this 
uncertainty. That doesn't mean that changes ought not to be made, 
but it does mean that changes ought not to be made unless you have 
a good reason. One ought to be able to identify an evil or a substan- 
tial inefficiency in the way the markets are functioning or a clear 
benefit to be gained. There is no better example than the steps that 
Congress has taken to deregulate deposit interest rate control. The 
markets had run circles around, and are still running circles around, 
the controls on deposit interest rates. The inefficiencies in the func- 
tioning of the markets are clear and the need for change is clear. 
THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY 
Let me start my framework of questions with the question of the 
relevance of history in its application to investment management. It 
is true that the study that was prepared by the SEC [Securities and 
Exchange Commission] in 1939 that gave rise to the Investment 
Company Act revealed many abuses in the management of invest- ' 
ment trusts. Many of those trusts were managed by banks. Neverthe- 
less, it seems to me very clear that the fundamental response to that 
problem, which was essentially viewed as an abuse of a fiduciary 
position, was not the Glass-Steagall Act, but the Investment Compa- 
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ny Act of 1940. Congress responded to the abuses with sections 17(a) 
and 17(d) of the 1940 Act,' which basically prohibits most conflict 
situations without prior approval of the Commission. 
Although the Supreme Court has decided that bank sponsorship 
of open-end funds is a violation of the Glass-Steagall Act, that kind 
of distribution activity hardly strikes at the core of what Congress was 
concerned about in 1933, when it adopted the prohibitions in sec- 
tions 16,' 20,3 and 21 of the National Banking Act. As for the pro- 
moter's interests with which the Court was so concerned in the Camp 
case,5 it seems to me that the promoter's interest is equally applicable 
to bank management of individual agency accounts and certainly 
bank management of commingled trust accounts of various sorts. In 
sum, commingled retail investment management does not introduce 
any substantial new dangers. 
MARKET FORCES AND REGULATORY CHANGE 
Secondly, consider market forces. It is very clear that any regula- 
tory scheme has to be consistent with fundamental economic trends. 
It ought not and cannot in the end respond to abstract notions of the 
way a market "ought to look." Inevitably any law that tends to segre- 
gate markets in a way that is inconsistent with basic economic trends 
will be doomed to failure. The effect of the economic conditions in 
the late sixties and the seventies on the market structure decisions 
that were made in the thirties have created the dissonance between 
the regulatory system and what people are actually doing that we see 
all around us today. 
Accordingly, I think we have to ask ourselves in this context why 
it is that banks want to offer retail commingled investment manage- 
ment services. I think there are three basic reasons. The first is that 
the squeeze on the profitability of traditional lending activities that 
has come from the volatility of interest rates has clearly driven banks 
15 U.S.C. $ 80a-17(a)(d)(1976). 
4 12 U.S.C. $ 24 (seventh)(l976). 
3 12 U.S.C. $ 377 (1976). 
4 12 U.S.C. $ 378 (1976). 
5 Investment Co. Inst. v .  Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). 
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to seek fee income, and fee income from investment management is 
an obvious choice. That is a perfectly good reason for banks to seek 
that end, but not a compelling poiicy reason to change the law. 
The second reason, which is stronger from the public policy 
point of view, has to do with efficiency with which banks use their 
existing resources. As I'm sure you all know, banks are now the 
largest single manager, as a group, of investment funds in the United 
States today. They manage in excess of $400 billion in private pen- 
sion funds alone. Having created that capability, there is strong pres- 
sure for it to be used as efficiently and in as broad a range of 
situations as possible. Again, while efficiency argues for an extension 
of bank power, Congress could certainly take into account counter- 
vailing policies. 
The third reason is more urgent, and that has to do with the 
recent offering by various kinds of financial institutions of integrated 
financial services to consumers. There is a powerful incentive for 
banks to put themselves on the same basis as Merrill Lynch. On the 
other hand, one can say that the same modern technology that has 
permitted Merrill Lynch to tie together investment management ser- 
vices offered by it with banking services offered by a bank would 
permit a bank to tie together banking services offered by, it with 
securities services offered by a securities firm -without integrating 
the institution itself. That is, the final product offered to the consum- 
er is not necessarily a function of the powers of the dominant institu- 
tion. We see this pattern developing today in a funny way with the 
growth of so-called "proprietary bank money market funds," in 
which the bank is an advisor to the money market fund. Funds are 
swept out of either demand deposit accounts or trust accounts into 
a bank-advised money market fund and a securities firm is inserted 
(sometimes in quite an awkward way) between the bank and its own 
customers as a distributor - and often the investment manager as 
well. This structure is proliferating at a fantastic rate all around us 
today, again in an attempt to offer an integrated package of services. 
Thirdly, we have to ask ourselves whether the regulatory world, 
as it exists today in the financial markets or in investment manage- 
ment, presents a viable equilibrium or  whether the internal strains in 
the system are bound to break down and change is inevitable. Using 
the proprietary bank money market fund as an example, it seems to 
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me that if banks are permitted to continue to act as advisors to 
open-end funds which .must be distributed by securities firms to the 
bank's own customers, then that situation is so unreal and so fraught 
with unnecessary transaction costs, that it simply cannot be main- 
tained over time. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that if institution- 
alization of savings continues and if banks continue to be the largest 
single factor in the investment management business in this country, 
then the logic of prohibiting them from rendering. those services to 
individuals will become increasingly more elusive. 
SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS ISSUES 
Certainly the central inquiry in each of these Glass-Steagall areas 
is the effect of the extension of bank securities activities on bank 
safety and soundness, on power, and on capital raising. The safety 
and soundness concern, more than any other element in this whole 
package, requires a contemporary review - a fresh look. The quality 
of bank regulation has changed drastically since 1933. In spite of the 
difficulty we've had in controlling the money supply, the degree of 
control of the monetary system that is actually exercised today by the 
Federal Reserve is drastically different than it was in 1933. The 
control over margin credit, which was totally out of hand in 1929, and 
the linkage between securities firms getting into trouble because of 
the crash and banks getting into trouble because of the extension of 
margin loans is under much greater control. Surely the quality of 
bank supervision has vastly increased. Moreover, if one were to look 
at the principal threats to bank stability today, the areas of greatest 
risk would be found in what I think most people would concede are 
clear banking activities: the trading of U.S. Treasury securities in a 
highly volatile interest rates environment is a risky business and the 
swings of losses and profits are very great. The trading of foreign 
currencies, which is an essential activity for an international bank, 
also offers special risks, as does lending to the governments of lesser 
developed countries. These activities involve risks that dwarf the kind 
of risk that is involved in the distribution of mutual fund securities. 
As Dave Silver is quick to point out, when one thinks about this 
issue, one has to examine the REIT [Real Estate Investment Trust] - 
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experience of the early 1970's. I would ask the question differently 
than he would. It seems to me the question is not what happened 
then, but what would have happened if a regulatory regime like the, 
Investment Company Act had been applicable to the relationship of 
banks to their associated REIT's. My guess is that the Congress is 
perfectly capable of creating a regulatory scheme that would deal 
with the bank-mutual fund relationship. 
The question of bank power is one which is not terribly relevant 
to the investment management issue. The  institutionalization of sav- 
ings has been so great that bank control over savings in the form of 
pension funds dwarfs the amount of additional funds that would be 
managed by banks if they were able to manage mutual funds (exclud- 
ing money market funds). That is, the amount of assets held in 
non-money market mutual funds is small compared to the assets that 
are currently managed by the banks. I would exclude from that equa- 
tion the funds currently held in money market funds. Money market 
funds are part of the deposit base. They exist only because of deposit 
interest rate controls. In countries which have no deposit interest 
rate controls, there are virtually no money market funds. Although 
many would disagree with me, I believe that if deposit interest rate 
controls were eliminated, money market funds would eventually dry 
up. 
BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE 
"LEVEL PLAYING FIELD" 
Next, is the question of the impact of bank investment manage- 
ment on the capital raising process. Although that question is very 
critical when one considers bank underwriting of corporate securities 
or revenue bonds, it is much less important when discussing invest- 
ment management. 
It is worth mentioning in passing that because money market 
funds are used by consumers as alternative deposit instruments, the 
whole question of bank management of money market funds raises 
a series of banking questions that are really quite unrelated to the 
6 15 U.S.C. QQ 80a-1-80a-52 (1976). 
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Glass-Steagall Act. Regulation Q7 imposes deposit interest rate con- 
trols. What sense does it make to have a regime that controls deposit 
interest rate controls on one hand and on the other hand, permit 
uncontrolled money market funds that are associated with bank 
deposit accounts? What of the impact of sweep arrangements on 
~ e ~ u l a t i o n  D and the efforts of the Fed to control the level of re- 
serves? 
Let me say just a word about the level playing field problem. It 
is very important to keep firmly in mind that there are really two 
aspects to it. One has to do with equal regulation and the other has 
to do with equality of function. On the regulatory side, it will very 
often be the case that a regulatory regime applied to the securities 
industry is transferrable virtually in toto to banks. That's certainly the 
case with application of the Investment Company Act to mutual fund 
management by banks. It may not be quite as easily applied as banks 
start to use the mutual fund structure as a substitution for collective 
investment funds and common trust funds. I'm not sure the share- 
holder democracy provisions fit the pension fund model. 
When the notion of equality is extended to function, then it 
starts to break down at the edges. Banks use the goal of competitive 
equality as an argument for interstate banking. They say, "we're 
competing with securities firnis, they have offices all over the country 
and we ought to too." Securities firms use it as an argument for 
deposits. I think that kind of argument is quite misguided. 
Each type of institution in our financial market has its own ad- 
vantages and disadvantages. Insurance companies, securities firms, 
banks, retailers, all attract the consumer dollar in a very different way. 
The resulting mosaic is one in which each institution functions in a 
niche in the market where the others have weaknesses; it is an enor- 
mous strength in our economy and we ought to take great steps to 
try and preserve that pattern. Competition does not require 
homogeneity.'Each kind of institution ought to be in a position to 
compete for the same consumer dollar, but with its own strengths. 
I won't say anything more about conflict of interests. It has been, 
and will continue to be, the source of detailed discussion by others. 
I think it should be perfectly possible to design a regulatory system 
which will deal with any conflicts of interest. Sometimes that system 
7 12 C.F.R. Part 217 (1982). 
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might, as does the Investment Company Act, prohibit self-dealing, or 
dealing between a bank and an associated fund. 
THE GROWTH OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
The last two points I want to make have to do with the relevance 
and experience and with the growth of unrelated intermediaries. One 
of the characteristics of all deregulation debates is a highly abstract 
, quality. On the one hand, we have people who are in favor of "com- 
petition," and on the other hand we have people who are against 
"abuse and overreaching" of depositors. If the Congress is actually 
going to go forward with legislation, it is important to bring that 
highly abstract debate down to a factual level. There is a wealth of 
real-world experience to inform the judgments. In the investment 
management area, we have the REIT experience, and we have the 
experience of bank management of a variety of individual accounts 
and commingled accounts. That ought to be examined and we ought 
to ask the question, "Have there been any substantial abuses and are 
they the kind of abuses that the law can deal with?" In the revenue 
bond area, banks have not only been underwriting municipal bonds 
(general obligation bonds) since 1933, but have participated very 
substantially in the revenue bond market - housing bonds recently, 
and others before that. That experience ought to be examined. We 
ought not have generalized debates about potential abuses. We 
ought to look at whether abuses have occurred. 
Finally, there is the question of the significance of the growth of 
unregulated financial institutions. The Sears money market fund is 
probably the most pointed example. I don't begin to know the long- 
term significance of that step and it may be that the Congress may 
have to make decisions before it is known, but that ought to be a focus 
of inquiry. It may be fruitless to say that banks can't do certain things 
if everyone else can and is doing them. One also has to ask about the 
relevance of insurance company activity to bank powers. Insurance 
companies are major providers of long-term credit in our society. 
In closing I want to make one comment on the way legislative 
change occurs in the financial markets area. Our Congress, and I 
think it's a strength of our political system, does not take radical 
steps. That means that congressional action is most likely to occur in. 
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those areas where the markets have really overtaken the old system. 
That has occurred in investment management,.into which banks have 
moved very heavily. If you want to see where the Congress is going, 
I think you'll have to look at where the market has gone. 
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